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Abstract 
 
Many scholars suggest that North Korea’s agriculture collapsed in the mid-1990s because 
of one of the three causes: overall economic decline, deficiencies of the socialist collective 
system, or environmental disaster. In contrast to these conventional explanations that view 
North Korea as an idiosyncratic failure, this paper argues that North Korea’s agricultural 
crisis is attributable to the unsustainable nature of modern industrial agriculture, rooted in 
the worldwide modernization project of the past two centuries.  From the outset, North 
Korea’s agricultural production had been predicated upon a high consumption of energy, 
petroleum-based chemicals, mechanization, and irrigation.  North Korea’s uniqueness lies 
not in the industrial agricultural methods used but in the extremity of their extensiveness 
achieved.  While the North achieved a substantial agricultural success for the first three 
decades thanks to these practices, it paid its early success with the collapse of the 1990s 
because these methods left an unsustainable level of physical and environmental 
externalities and because their insatiable need for inputs could no longer be met. 
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Introduction 
Modern agriculture in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK; hereafter 
refer to as North Korea) was a poster child for successful modernization for several decades 
until its spectacular collapse in the mid-1990s. This turn of events is a curious development 
considering the high level of agricultural achievement North Korea claimed until the mid-
1980s. Just two decades prior to a mammoth-famine that claimed nearly 1 million lives out of 
a population of 22 million,i North Korea was considered the original “Korean miracle,”ii 
putting “all the economic miracles of the postwar world in the shade” by virtue of its 
achievements (Robinson 546). Many foreign observers of North Korea,iii as well as UN 
agencies, concurred that North Korea’s development strategy was successful in 
industrializing the country and promoting agricultural development for many years prior to 
the collapse in the early 1990s.  Despite the limits of nature and topographical disadvantages 
of being mountainous country with a short growing season, and despite the massive 
destruction inflicted during the Korean War and economic blockade, in 1984, only a decade 
prior to the famine, North Korea reported a record high grain production of 10 million (8.25 
million tons milled at the conversion ratio of 80%), far exceeding the consumption 
requirement of its population.  
 
Cereal yields grew rapidly from slightly over 3 million tonsiv in 1960 to over 7 
million tons in 1980, reaching around 8 million tons at the peak of grain production four 
years later,v as Figure 1 illustrates.vi  By 1989, however, the North’s grain production shrank 
to 6.74 million tons. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                    2 
Figure 1: Grain Production in North Korea (milled), 1960-2004 
 
 
Note: Figures are for rice, maize, and all other cereal grain. Source: Data was extracted from official North Korean 
publications: Kim Il Sung’s annual New Year addresses, and Economic Development in the DPRK (Pyongyang: Foreign 
Languages Press, 1993), in K. Quinones; FAO/WFP Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission to the DPRK, every year 
from 1995 to 2004. The 1995 report contained information for 1989, 1993 and 1995. 
Its cereal production had fallen further to 5.44 million tons by 1993, a full year before 
adverse weather wreaked havoc on cereal production in 1994 and 1995 (UN FAO, Crop and 
Food Supply Assessment 1995).  From 1989 to 1993, overall cereal production declined by 
some 20 percent, as Figure 2 shows.  Even without the climatic setbacks of 1995, grain yields 
would have been some 3.1 million tons for paddy and 2.7 million for maize.vii While crops 
were clearly affected by the extreme variations in climatic conditions in 1994 and 1995, 
yields declined substantially more than can be explained by the direct effects of adverse 
weather conditions alone. 
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Figure 2: Estimated paddy and maize production in North Korea, 1989-1997    
(Unit: thousand tons) 
 
 
 
Note:  Data 1989-1994 from the North Korean Agricultural Commission; 1995-1997 FAO Estimate. Source: 
FAO.  Special Report FAO/WFP Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission to the DPRK. November 1997 
 
This paper analyzes the dramatic contrast between the two periods, North Korea’s 
high performance for the two earlier decades and its disastrous one since the mid-1980s. 
How was North Korea able to manage in the 1960s and 1970s its agricultural sector to 
produce enough food for its growing population and to support its economic development? If 
it had been so successful then, why did its modern agriculture disintegrate so suddenly 
afterwards?  This paper examines the processes involved in the rise and demise of modern, 
industrial agriculture in North Korea, from the beginning of its development to its failure in 
the mid-1990s, to see what lies behind that tragic collapse.  It argues that the modern 
industrial agriculture that Pyongyand had wholeheartedly implemented since the beginning 
was responsible for both the successes of the 1960s and 1970s and the failures of the later 
period.  The seed of its failure had been sown by its earlier success. 
 
Explaining the North’s Agriculture 
The existing literature on the North Korean food crisis falls broadly within three 
archetypical arguments: economic decline, organizational/institutional deficiencies in the 
socialist collective system, or environmental/ecological factors.  But the debates on the 
decline of the agricultural production typically take place within the confines of seeking the 
causal factors to famine and food crisis rather than focusing on the agricultural system as a 
whole.  As a result, the literature may offer a partial explanation for part of the North’s 
agriculture but fails to account for the entire trajectory, its early meteoric rise and precipitous 
demise later.  Of the following explanations, the economic argument seems to carry the most 
currency among scholars within the study of North Korean agriculture, even if it has serious 
shortcomings. 
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Economic argument 
Many scholars argue that North Korea’s economic decline was the main culprit of its 
agricultural collapse.  While differing on the causes of the economic decline, they share a 
consensus that North Korea was not free from the contours of world economy, despite its 
claims of economy self-reliance and independence.  Although its critics called it autarkic and 
closed, North Korea was, like many other countries, an import-dependent country that relied 
heavily upon the former Soviet Union and China for such critical imports as crude oil, 
petroleum products, coking coal, and machine parts.  And their imports were essential to the 
operation of its industrial sector.  
 
As the socialist bloc disintegrated in 1989, and once Russia joined the ranks of the 
liberal economies in 1991, North Korea no longer received economic assistance or 
preferential treatment on trade from Russia. This situation was exacerbated by China’s 
demand for hard currency when trading with North Korea in 1993. Consequently, North 
Korea’s ability to import critical inputs was reduced drastically, and this meiosis placed a 
severe strain on the North Korea’s industrial sector. Since North Korea’s industrialized 
agriculture depended heavily on its industrial sector, as well as on imported fuel and 
petroleum products, agricultural decline occurred alongside the economic contraction (UN 
FAO Crop and Food Supply Assessment, 1996; UNDP, “DPRK”; Noland, Robinson and 
Wang). 
 
In addition to above general points of the economic argument, Philip Park (2002) 
makes an observation that the structure of the North Korean economy as the source of 
agricultural breakdown. Park posits that the problem of agricultural decline stemmed from 
the overall structure of the North Korea’s self-reliant economy. Since North Korea’s policy 
of economic self-reliance promoted a comprehensive and integrated national economy, each 
sector of the economy was closely interlinked with the others. This interconnection meant 
that a setback in one industry was likely to cause a ripple effect throughout the entire 
economy. Park argues that even though the North Korean economy was mostly self-reliant, a 
small percentage (15 percent of GNP) of foreign trade was critical to the function of the 
economy, and when a severe reduction in the critical imports from Russia and China 
occurred, the shortage triggered a domino effect of severe economic problems in the North 
Korean economy. In other words, the industrial sector’s failure to provide adequate inputs to 
the agricultural sector prompted a downward spiral; once the vicious cycle started, recovery 
was not possible because North Korea did not have access to the benefits offered by the 
global system to relieve bottlenecks or absorb economic shocks. Philip Park explained, “The 
cause of hunger lies in the deeply rooted structural problems” of the North Korean economy 
(116).   
 
Another variation in this line of argument is proposed by Peter Hayes and a team of 
energy experts affiliated with the Nautilus Institute (2000). They argue that the decline in 
agricultural production in North Korea is directly linked to the crisis in the energy sector, 
attributable to the fact that North Korean agriculture is closely bounded to the energy regime. 
The Nautilus team cites two decisive factors in the deterioration in the energy sector: 
cessation of concessionary imports of oil and energy-related products in the early 1990s, and 
reduction in the domestic sources of commercial energy such as coal and hydroelectric power 
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due to contracting economy and the infrastructure damages incurred in the floods of 1995 
and 1996. This crisis in the energy sector precipitated a grievous drop in fertilizer, fuels, and 
electricity that seriously affected fecundity of soil, availability of motive power for irrigation 
and agriculture including field and farm activities. Hence, the team suggests that to solve the 
food and agricultural problem North Korea first needs to rehabilitate its energy sector.  
 
On the other hand, Chol Kyu Kim (2002) attributes the agricultural collapse to the 
disintegration of the “socialist international system” in which North Korean agriculture was 
embedded. North Korea’s economy was developed within the socialist world economy, 
shaped by North Korea’s semi-peripheral status within the socialist world system; 
consequently, its rise and fall depended upon the material condition of that system. The 
North Korean agricultural sector grew in part on the basis of imported inputs and external 
assistance during the 1960s and 1970s; when the socialist world system imploded, North 
Korea’s external material base disappeared, resulting in the collapse of its agricultural 
production system.   
 
Organizational/institutional argument 
 Alongside the economic argument, the institutional/organizational argument claims 
the majority of existing literatures. The main thesis in this line of argument focuses on 
inherent deficiencies in socialist collective farming, and it identifies over-centralization of 
decision-making in agricultural management and practices, an extensive and inflexible state 
bureaucracy in economic and social life, and the absence of farmer incentive stemming from 
collective farming as the primary causes of the agricultural collapse in North Korea (Choe; 
Eberstadt; Noland, Robinson, and Wang; Brem and Kim; Y. Y. Kim; Nam).  
 
Within the realm of over-centralization of decision-making, one of the problems often 
cited is the use of Juche (self-reliance) farming methods, and organizational arrangements.viii 
For example, scholars refer to Juche farming methods as one of the primary causes of North 
Korea’s drop in food production, arguing that such methods are based on political reasoning, 
not agricultural science (Bu et al., Kwon), with farmers being forced to implement the 
methods in a rigid political system. To the contrary, Juche methods are said to be based on 
agricultural science intended to increase productivity by intensive management of crop 
production system such as ‘suitable crops for suitable land,’ ‘time of seeding,’ ‘high-density 
cultivation,’ and ‘systemic fertilization (Nam).’ In order to understand the logic behind North 
Korea’s crop management system, including Juche methods, is that it is a component of the 
much larger whole of industrial agriculture in North Korea; therefore the critique of Juche 
methods should be considered within the larger whole of industrial agriculture in North 
Korea, not apart from it. In the context of inadequate inputs to support these methods, 
however, the failure of Juche methods points to existing agricultural problems rather than 
serves to condemn the methods themselves.  
 
Another issue frequently raised by the institutional line of argument is that of 
property ownership and farmer incentive. It has been argued that common property 
ownership prevents farmers from making an investment in agriculture, since under the 
collective system, farmers are de facto state employed agricultural workers, and as such they 
comply with government plans for production at a minimal level. Furthermore, bureaucratic 
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intervention is exogenous to any successful management of the farm organization, and 
because of this bureaucratic imperative, together with the individual farmer’s inability to 
make any decisions on his/her own, farmers do not have any incentives to outperform. Often, 
these scholars propose the privatization of property and the transition to a market economy as 
the only viable option for North Korea’s survival (Doh; Nam). Agricultural performance in 
China after decollectivization is often held up as an example of the major role 
collectivization has played in North Korea’s agricultural failure. China’s success in 
increasing the rate of annual grain yield from 2.7 percent during collectivization (1957–1978) 
to the annual rate of 8.9 percent after shifting to a household responsibility system (1979–
1984) is often cited as evidence of the smashing success of decollectivization (Brem and 
Kim). However, this type of argument ignores the fact that the structure of economies of two 
countries are different: China’s economy was dominated by agricultural sector at the time of 
decollectivization whereas North Korea’s economy is not.  
 
Environmental argument 
The last of the three arguments lies within many existing literatures as a secondary 
factor contributing to North Korea’s agricultural decline (Noland, Robinson and Wang; T.-J. 
Kwon). When the North Korean government first approached the international community 
for assistance in September 1995, it had indicated that food production collapsed because of 
the natural calamities that occurred in August of that year. The explanation of natural disaster 
was invoked by many non-governmental organizations and by the World Food Program 
(WFP) in providing humanitarian assistance to North Korea in 1995, 1996, and 1997. UN 
agencies and others also have acknowledged the 1995 and 1996 floods and the 1997 drought 
and tidal wave as having a devastating impact on food production and the subsequent 
collapse in agriculture (FAO/WFP annual report on crop and food supply assessment, from 
1995-2004; UNDP 1998; Nautilus Institute 2000, 2001, 2002). Reports by UN agencies—the 
FAO/WFP—consistently raise the issue of environmental degradation as a factor 
contributing to decreases in agricultural production. The extent to which North Korean 
environmental degradation has occurred has been alarming, and in 2003, the UN 
Environmental Programme issued a status report on North Korea’s environmental situation, 
noting a direct link between the national food production policy and land degradation. UNEP 
called for an increase in ‘restorative policies and practices.’ 
 
Unlike others, Woo-Cumings identifies the environmental factor as one of the main 
elements in the occurrence of famine and agricultural crisis in North Korea. She traces a 
history of ecological disasters that had negatively affected fragile economies in the last three 
decades—such as the devastating droughts in sub-Saharan Africa in the 1970s and 1980s; the 
El Nino events of 1972–1973, when droughts occurred around the world simultaneously, 
affecting food production from the Soviet Union, China, India, Central America, Australia, 
Indonesia, Argentina, Brazil, West Africa, and Ethiopia—and the devastating El Nino, 
reconstituted on a larger scale in 1982, and again in 1997–1998. Woo-Cumings posits that 
the North Korean agricultural crisis, and of course famine, in large part, were caused by the 
ecological impact. She provides evidence of North Korea’s aberrant weather pattern in the 
1990s: 1995–1996 (floods), 1997 (“worst droughts in decades”), and 2000–2001 (drought) 
that swept away large parts of North Korea’s arable land and its harvests. Woo-Cumings 
argues that North Korea was at the epicenter of a global ecological disaster in the 1990s,ix 
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and this explains the extent to which North Korea’s agricultural production dropped. Woo-
Cumings states, “The famine in North Korea was part and parcel of a global ecological 
disaster, happening with greater frequency as the result of the global warming.” (33)  
 
All three clusters of arguments contribute to partially advancing our understanding of 
the agricultural collapse in North Korea. None alone provides a causal understanding on what 
precipitated the collapse of the agricultural production system. If the economic argument 
attributing North Korean agricultural collapse to the overall economic decline holds, one 
could assume that once the required inputs are provided, production would recover to the 
previous level. However, such a recovery is unlikely considering the state of soil fecundity 
and environmental degradation. Rather, a growing body of evidence indicates the 
deterioration of land and water resources in North Korea. In the organizational argument, if 
one supposes that over-centralization of decision-making and lack of farmer incentive in 
North Korea is the main cause of production decline in the 1990s, how does one explain the 
fact that for many decades North Korea achieved an impressive increase in agricultural 
production with little change in incentives or planning systems? Furthermore, agriculture in 
North Korea was far more decentralized from the mid-1960s on, and even more so after the 
mid-1980s. By then, North Korea was far more decentralized, with fewer than seven to eight 
people on a team that was permanently assigned to a given area of land and implements.x  
Many of the farmers stayed in a small sub-team unit, often made up of their own relatives, 
for most of their lives. Finally, while the environmental argument explains the state of the 
ongoing devastation as well as the fact that its fragility was further aggravated by natural 
calamities of the scale of those in 1995 and 1996, it does not explain the cause of the 
environmental degradation itself. Certainly, environmental destruction has been caused by 
both internal and external elements, but it cannot be argued that global ecological disaster has 
caused the collapse of agriculture in North Korea. 
 
In contrast to above three conventional explanations, this paper argues that North 
Korea’s agricultural crisis is attributable to the unsustainable nature of modern industrial 
agriculture, rooted in the worldwide modernization project of the past two centuries. 
 
Development of the agricultural system in North Korea 
 
Reorganization of Agrarian Society from 1945 to 1960 
From the time of the national liberation from Japan in 1945 to the time the Korean 
War broke out in 1950, political regimes in the north and south were in fierce competition 
with each other to win over the hearts and minds of the Korean people. During these five 
years, the political situation was still fluid, and the national division had not yet been firmly 
established; what happened in one zone influenced what followed in the other. In this context, 
the North Korean provisional government (the official name was the Provisional People’s 
Committee of North Korea (PPCNK) until 1948)xi began reorganizing various parts of its 
economy and society in the northern zone. Because Korea was an agrarian society in which 
80% of the people were involved in some type of agricultural production, the agrarian 
revolution was considered one of the most important elements in post-colonial nation-
building. A successful agrarian revolution could have meant being one step closer to winning 
ultimate control of the nation.  
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In 1943, two years prior to the liberation, 44.2% of North Korean peasants were 
landless involved in tenant farming or employed as farm labor, and if the part-tenants (the 
peasants who had some land of their own, and rented the rest) are included in the calculation, 
the rate of tenancy goes up to 75%, with most farms less than 1 hectare, and only 4% of the 
farms larger than 5 hectares (Chung 5). In other words, three out of four farm households 
were either landless or perilously close to being landless, with too small of a plot to 
adequately sustain a farm family after rent was taken out. Against this backdrop, in March 
1946, PPCNK instituted land reform where nearly one million hectares of confiscated land 
were redistributed to 724,522 households, with less than 2% under state ownership (S. B. 
Kim 175). Each household received an average of 1.33 hectares of arable land; the 
redistribution benefited more than 70% of the rural population, or about 50% of the total 
population of North Korea at the time, and covered more than 50% of the cultivable acreage 
(US Department of State 56).  
 
Upon the completion of the land reform in March 1946, PPCNK initiated a series of 
agrarian policies to further reshape the productive relations and to restructure the 
management of natural resources. However, North Korea’s well-known emphasis on food 
self-sufficiency as a cornerstone of its national development policy comes after the war. 
Their perception of agriculture as a fundamental base of “national security” seemed to have 
been forged from the experience of the devastation of the countryside and agricultural base 
during the war by the blanket bombing of the U.S. on one hand, and the continuing division 
of the Korean peninsula, and the threat of military hostility at the height of the Cold War, on 
the other. The North Korean government believed that without a secure base of food supply, 
North Korea would be vulnerable to foreign domination and military aggression (S. B. Kim, 
Historical Experience).  
  
Immediately following the cessation of the war, North Korea instituted another round 
of agrarian reform, this time the changes affected not only land ownership, but also the way 
in which the rural communities were organized and administered. From 1954 to 1958, the 
country’s farm households were transformed into cooperative farms through three phases of 
cooperativization, gradually leading to a full integration into becoming collectivized over the 
five-year period on a “voluntary” basis, and there were state-supported inducements for those 
communities that became “socialist cooperatives.” These phases were not so clear-cut, and 
all three types existed over the five years until 1958, when the collectivization process was 
completed, and the entire rural population came under cooperative management except for a 
small population of agricultural workers employed by the state farms. Nevertheless, each 
farm household was allowed to keep a small garden plot (“kitchen-garden”)xii and fruit trees 
and to raise small domestic livestock for family consumption and sale at the farmers’ market 
(Robinson 546). The “phase-in” and “voluntary” strategies seemed to have worked to 
minimize potential resistance as well as to prepare peasants for a smoother transition into 
collectivization. The historical timing might have worked to the state’s favor in the transition 
from private ownership to cooperative ownership. North Korea experienced high casualties 
and population migration to South Korea during the war that had contributed to labor 
shortage in the rural area. This situation, together with limited production tools and available 
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draught animals for individual farming in post-war North Korea might have peasants to 
consider pooling resources to be more beneficial option in contrast to individual farming.  
 
While cooperativization was in progress, the size and scale of cooperatives grew. In 
1953, the average size of a cooperative was 14.7 households, and the average size of a farm 
was around 13.6 hectares. The following year, the number of households per cooperative 
doubled to 32.9, with the corresponding landholdings quadrupling. The trend of increase in 
both cooperative size and landholdings continued until 1957. In the final year of the 
cooperativization process, the Government redistricted the basic, local administrative unit of 
Rixiii to include all cooperatives within a Ri, and this resulted in enlarging the average size of 
a farm from 105 hectares to 466 hectares. Table 1 shows this consolidation process of 
cooperatives from 1953 to 1958. One of the main reasons for this consolidation appears to be 
to create large-scale farming, with a view to “speed up the technical revolution” that the 
Government believed to be the most advantageous for socialist construction (I. S. Kim, Our 
Country’s Experiences 45). To the present day, cooperative farms have remained the 
dominant form of farm and rural organization in North Korea whereby everything, including 
land, farm facilities, and implements, is owned collectively by cooperative members, who are 
paid incomes in shares of what they produce.  
Table 1: Agricultural cooperativization in North Korea, 1953–1958 
 
Year Total # of 
atives 
Number 
ehold 
Percent 
ehold 
Size of 
old per 
tive(A) 
Average size  
erative 
boxiv)(B) 
Arable 
hongbo) 
d 
Arable 
%) involved 
1953 806 11,879 1.2% 14.7 13.6 11,000 0.6% 
1954 10,098 332,662 21.8% 32.9 57.0 576,000 30.9% 
1955 12,132 511,323 49.0% 42.1 72.9 885,000 48.6% 
1956 15,825 864,837 80.9% 54.7 88.3 1,397,000 77.9% 
1957 16,032 1,025,106 95.6% 63.9 105.0 1,687,000 93.7% 
1958 3,843 1,055,015 100.0% 274.5 466.0 1,791,000 100.0% 
 
Source: (A) and (B) are extrapolated from Kyung-Saeng Bu et al. 2001, p.73; All other come from Democratic People’s 
Republic of Korea (DPRK). Central Statistical Board of the State Planning Commission. Statistical Returns of National 
Economy of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (1946-1960). Pyongyang: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 
1981. 
 
Modernization of North Korean Agriculture 
North Korea’s topography does not lend itself to be a fertile agricultural base. The 
total land area is about 12.3 million hectares, of which 75% is mountainous and unsuitable 
for agriculture (Bu et al.). Of the remaining land area, about 16.4% (1.99 million hectares) is 
arable (Bu et al.). The limited potential for expanding domestic food production through area 
expansion, together with the drive for food grain self-sufficiency, has meant that North Korea 
has stressed intensification of agriculture through modernization of the rural sector, the 
                                                                                                                                    10 
country’s stated policy goals since the early 1950s. The main features of the intensification 
strategy have been through irrigation, mechanization, the intensive use of agro-chemicals, 
and the development of hybrid seeds, and to support the strategy a full rural electrification.  
 
A watershed decision in the future of agriculture in North Korea took place in 
February 1964, when the Korean Workers’ Party (KWP) adopted “Theses on the Socialist 
Rural Question in Our Country,” proposed by then-President Kim Il Sung. In the Rural 
Theses, the argument was made that the fundamental problem in rural North Korea was the 
backwardness of its population and the existing material and cultural gap between the rural 
and urban centers. The Government believed these were the elements that kept North Korea 
from transitioning into a successful communist country (Kim, Implementation). Solutions to 
the problem, the Government argued, have to begin with a paradigmatic shift in the way 
agrarian issues are problematized, and it offered three basic principles to address the problem: 
1) technical, cultural, and ideological revolutions in the countryside; 2) the working-class 
leadership of the peasantry, the assistance of industry to agriculture, and the support of the 
towns to rural areas; and 3) industrial methods of management of agriculture and rural 
economy, as well as further consolidation of ownership and management of the agricultural 
collectivization (I. S. Kim, Rural Theses 163–212). The Government also believed it was the 
“backwardness” of semi-socialist cooperative ownership and non-scientific management that 
were preventing the peasantry from progressing toward the genuine form of ‘socialist 
agriculture.’ The Government advocated a, “[move] towards steadily bringing the method of 
management and operation of agricultural cooperative economy closer to the advanced 
industrial method of enterprise management” (I. S. Kim, Implementation 13). The 
Government also indicated that cooperative farming was “being rapidly equipped with 
modern technology,” and that “the scale of management in agriculture is expanding and . . . 
approaching the level of industry in technical equipment” (Implementation 13).  
 
This meant that North Korea would accelerate the modernization of the rural area 
through technological innovation and socialization process, not only to ‘upgrade’ agricultural 
technology on the production side but also to socialize the peasantry into becoming socialist 
farmers as the state gradually consolidated cooperative ownership into state ownership. What 
these three core principles reveal, then, is the state’s attitude toward modernization and 
development in the context of the socialist construction: the notion of modernization and 
development of farm sector was synonymous with industrialization, and industrialization was 
viewed as a socialist silver bullet to North Korea’s developmental challenges. The technical 
revolution was indeed a social and political project, not just an economic and technological 
solution to develop rural productive forces.  
 
Within this framework, North Korean agriculture became more capital intensive in 
production, highly mechanized in labor, with high application of agro-chemicals, abandoning 
its traditional agriculture, with its rotational systems and organic fertilizing, in favor of the 
industrial model. North Korea wanted to produce an agricultural surplus sufficient to solve its 
food insecurity as well as to serve the needs of an industrializing North Korea. It was during 
this period that the country’s industrial and agricultural sectors became irrevocably linked, so 
much so that the agricultural sector became a de facto hostage to the industrial sector. During 
this time, North Korea also began working on developing hybrid seed varieties of its staple 
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foods, rice and maize, that would require large amounts of fertilizer and water. From the 
1960s to early part of the 1980s, substantial investments were made in agriculture. The land 
expansion programs and rural development plans were designed to take advantage of modern 
technology; therefore these programs accelerated the need for: 1) enlarging the irrigation 
networks, 2) electrification of the rural areas, 3) land realignment to establish large tracts of 
land for mechanization, and 4) further application of chemical fertilizers and other agro-
chemicals. In addition, through the conversion of coastal and swamp lands, total agricultural 
land grew about 16%, from 1.8 million hectares in 1946 to 2.1 million hectares in 1984 
(Republic of Korea, Economic Statistics 1992). The next five sub-sections will briefly detail 
the development of each of the four pillars of the technical revolution, and the development 
of hybrid seeds that was responsible for increasing food production for close to three decades.  
 
Irrigation 
 In the Rural Theses, the centrality of irrigation in the technical revolution is 
emphasized since in the “hybrid seed-fertilizer-water” scheme of agricultural production, 
timely supply of water is an indispensable requirement. North Korea’s annual rainfall of 
1,000–1,200mm is concentrated in the period between May and September, and half of the 
rainfall tends to occur in July and August. This means that both drought and floods are 
frequent problems, particularly in the rice-bowl area of the southwest plains, and hence 
means to control the water becomes vital. Another contributing factor to the irrigation drive 
was that with the land expansion program the western sea reclamation area needed supply of 
fresh water.xv  
 
Irrigation projects began with rice paddies then continued to fan out to non-paddy 
fields and upland areas. Irrigated land increased from 227,000 hectares in 1954 to 1.2 million 
hectares in 1988. According to a US Government source, by 1990, North Korea had more 
than “1,700 reservoirs throughout the country, watering 1.4 million hectares of fields with a 
ramified irrigation network of 40,000 kilometers, which irrigated about 70% of the country’s 
arable land” (US Library of Congress, North Korea Country Studies). To create this 
extensive system of irrigation, North Korea developed vast and complex networks of 
waterways covering not only grain fields, but also the permanent crop area of around 300,000 
hectares (UNDP FAO, AREP 1998 WP 1:6), of which the majority were in upland areas, 
with the irrigation networks consisting of a double-circular system for drainage and irrigation 
throughout the agricultural areas, intended to provide protection against both drought and 
flood.  
 
Counter-intuitive to a mountainous country, North Korea constructed an elaborate 
electrical and diesel fuel supported pumping system – there are 3,505 pump stations for the 
existing major networks alone – to irrigate both low and upland areas, instead of utilizing a 
gravity-fed system on such terrain. Frequently, Irrigation water is pumped to reservoirs from 
which it is distributed to crops by canals, a process which requires further pumping in many 
cases. Groundwater is not extensively used, except in the west coastal plains where there are 
2,500 tube-wells, 53,000 open-wells, and 66,500 springs used for irrigation (UNDP FAO, 
AREP 1998 WP [Working Paper] 1:7). In addition to establishing more of a general irrigation 
system, i.e., reservoir, canals, etc., North Korea has introduced an extensive field sprinkler 
system and other methods of supplying water to the fields. About 400,000 hectares of 
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irrigated uplands require pumping of water, supplied through pipelines from which the water 
is distributed by “mobile water guns, sprinkler, furrow and other drip methods for fruit trees” 
(UNDP FAO, AREP 1998, WP 1:7). According to the UNDP, the furrow irrigation in 
uplands is done on steep hillsides, potentially causing erosion, and this type of system is 
costly to operate, although the system greatly enhances production rate to more than twofold. 
This electricity and diesel fuel-dependent system was supported by what seemed to be a 
healthy energy sector as long as the entire system worked as planned.  
 
Electrification 
Rural electrification was the basic building block for the North Korean agricultural 
development, and of the four main tasks of the “technical revolution,” electrification has 
been achieved most successfully. It has been reported that by spring of 1969, 91.2% of the 
North Korean rural households (both farm and non-farm households)xvi had access to 
electricity (M. W. Lee, Rural North Korea 72-73), and 100% of all rural households had 
access to electricity by 1974. Rural electrification in North Korea took place relatively early 
in its national development, and the system was quite extensive. One goal of electrification 
was to fuel rural mechanization with a limited use of gasoline/diesel fuel. Since North Korea 
lacks domestic petroleum reserves, but has an abundant amount of coal deposits for operating 
thermo-electric power plants and the capacity for hydroelectric generation because of its 
mountainous topography, it was much more rational and practical to build a self-reliant 
economy based on domestic sources of electric power rather than imported petroleum.  
 
Mechanization 
A visible, successful mechanization program was important to North Korea for both 
symbolic and practical reasons. First and foremost, mechanization was needed to increase 
labor productivity in the face of labor shortages, and to “ease the workload of the peasants” (I. 
S. Kim, Implementation 19) by relieving them of using rudimentary, manual implements for 
backbreaking farm labor. The Korean War left North Korea with a significantly reduced 
population, both from war casualties and from those who left the North for South Korea. 
Also, with the development of urban centers and an industrial sector, the population shift 
occurred in favor of industry; consequently, rural area felt the shortage of labor. 
Mechanization also meant that North Korea was socially and economically progressing—a 
sign of development and a symbol of socialist achievement. Relief from hard labor is 
evidenced by the priority given to the most difficult tasks in fieldwork. Plowing, 
transplanting, and transporting operations were the first to be fully mechanized. 
 
North Korea’s land utilization also gave impetus to mechanization. As discussed in 
the earlier part of this paper, upon the completion of cooperativization in 1958, a major 
program was initiated to expand the large-scale farming. The Government considered the 
prevailing size of cooperatives to be too small to realize economies of scale, particularly for 
taking advantage of farm machineries. Farm mechanization was regarded as one of the most 
powerful ways of transforming traditional farming into a modern system. All cooperatives, 
which had been based on the traditional village unit, were merged to make a single 
cooperative in each Ri. Consequently, the number of cooperatives fell from 16,000 to fewer 
than 4,000, while the average size of a cooperative’s landholdings expanded to 
approximately 450-500 hectares, each containing about 300 farm households. Cooperative 
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farms account for about 90% of cultivated land and agricultural production, and state farms 
for 10%. State farms are model farms run as industrial enterprises involved in specialized 
production, e.g., seed farms, or test-run new production methods. They are generally larger 
and more highly mechanized than cooperatives. North Korea’s mechanization was centered 
on tractor usage.  
 
During the First Seven-Year Plan (1961–1970), the number of tractors tripled, and by 
1992, the number reached 75,000. If that number is calculated based on 15 horsepower (HP), 
North Korea produced 764 in 1953, 2,561 in 1956, 12,500 in 1960, and 20,000 in 1964  
(Republic of Korea, Economic Statistics 215). North Korea was able to allocate 1.22 tractors 
per 100 hectares in 1970, and 6–7 tractors per 100 hectares in 1980, based on approximately 
2 million hectares of arable land. This increase in tractor usage can be attributed to North 
Korea’s ability to produce its own machinery with indigenous technology and material fairly 
early in the nation’s development. Overall mechanization in agriculture increased 
significantly throughout the three decades from the 1960s to 1980s, as the mechanization 
program intensified. Fieldwork requiring intensive labor such as plowing, transplanting, and 
threshing was fully mechanized by 1975 (S.-H. Ko). According to the UNDP, “77% of all 
field-level agricultural production needs, including on-farm primary processing,” had been 
mechanized by the late 1980s. On the other hand, 9% of the farm power is contributed by the 
agricultural labor force of 3.4 million people under normal circumstances, and 14% by 
draught animals in North Korea (UNDP FAO, AREP 1998 WP 2:1).  
 
Chemicalization 
North Korea’s high productivity rate throughout the modernization drive of 1960 to 
the mid-1980s is partly attributed to increased usage of agro-chemicals: chemical fertilizer, 
insecticides, herbicides, and so forth. Of all agro-chemical inputs in North Korea, petroleum-
based fertilizer has been one of the most significant inputs. However, North Korea does not 
produce any petroleum, hence whether fertilizer is produced in the country or imported from 
outside, North Korea is totally dependent on outside petroleum. At the time of decolonization, 
North Korea had several large functional chemical fertilizer factories, but the Korean War 
decimated these factories, and production fell to a negligible level. North Korea increased 
fertilizer production by building new small and medium-size plants or rebuilding existing old 
facilities, and President Kim Il Sung threw his weight behind it with the slogan, “Fertilizer is 
rice, and rice is socialism!” (Experience in Solving 87) By 1954, North Korea claimed to 
have reconstituted fertilizer production to 259,800 metric tons (Experience in Solving 87). 
Hungnam Ammonium Sulphate and Ammonium Nitrate production facilities were rebuilt in 
1955 and 1958, respectively. In 1961, a decree was issued to promote the production and the 
usage of chemical fertilizer, especially petroleum-based urea and ammonium sulphate, and 
the first urea plant was commissioned in 1966. Subsequently, there was a strong push for 
building new fertilizer plants, and by 1984 North Korea reported the total production of 4.7 
million tons (US Library of Congress, North Korea Country Studies). Most of North Korea’s 
requirements for the nutrient nitrogen were met by the production from these plants. 
However, potassium fertilizer is not produced domestically due to a lack of the raw material 
potash although Sariwon Potassium Fertilizer Factory Complex has been in construction 
since 1988. If completed, Sariwon complex can produce 500,000 tons of potassium fertilizer 
annually (US Library of Congress, North Korea Country Studies). Again, even if North 
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Korea can produce its own potassium, it will be in a situation similar to petroleum products: 
to import the raw material.  
 
Accordingly, the application of chemical fertilizer (NPK) grew rapidly between 1960 
and 1984. North Korea reported that the rate of chemical fertilizer application in 1960 was 
160 kg per hectare. By 1975, the application rate surpassed one metric ton per hectare (S.B. 
Kim 315), and by the mid-1980s, it claimed to have reached all time high of two tons per 
hectare (US Library of Congress, North Korea Country Studies). UN FAO confirms the high 
rate of chemical fertilizer application in North Korea over time. Table 2 provides a 
contextual glimpse into this situation by comparing North Korea’s application rate with its 
East Asian neighbors. North Korea recorded on a par with South Korea in 1990 although the 
South Korean economy was far larger by than that of North Korea. Whether two tons per 
hectare in the mid-1980s or 0.4 tons per hectare in 1990, both figures indicate North Korea to 
be one of the highest fertilizer consumption nation in the world. 
 
Table 2: Fertilizer use in North Korea and other East Asian countries (kg/hectare) 
Year Japan China Vietnam South 
Korea 
North 
Korea 
1972 386 53 45 288 194 
1990 -- 289 101 415 405 
Source: FAO Production Yearbooks in Smith and Huang (2004).xvii 
North Korea has also been known to use a high rate of pesticide, fungicide, and 
herbicide from domestic production and from imports, mostly from China and Japan. North 
Korea produces a part of what it uses from imported raw material, but it also relies on the 
import of various agro-chemicals. Table 3 shows North Korea’s production amount of 
pesticides and fungicide from 1979 to 1988. In 1994, domestic production dropped to about 
one-third that of 1988, and the total application amount of pesticides was approximately 
18,000 tons (UNDP, unpublished proposal).  
 
Table 3: North Korea’s pesticide and fungicide production  (Unit: metric ton) 
Year 1979 1982–1983 1988 
Production amount 24,000 25,000 30,000 
Source: Extrapolated from Bu, Kyong-Saeng, et al. (2001) North Korean Agriculture. (Seoul National University Press, 
Seoul, Korea). 
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Development of Hybrid Seeds and Emphasis on Scientific Farming Method 
In its quest for food self-sufficiency, North Korea emphasized scientific approaches 
to farming. In particular, North Korea intensified its efforts in the area of: 1) development of 
high yielding varieties, 2) transplantation of maize seedlings, 3) water management 
techniques, and 4) systematic management of fertilizer application. In many ways North 
Korea’s scientific farming approach mirrored that of the US-led Green Revolution; it 
emphasized a “hybrid seed-fertilizer-water” approach and focused on mono-cropping, and to 
realize the varieties’ high potential, it applied high doses of chemical fertilizer, pesticides, 
and water. North Korea embarked on revolutionizing its traditional seed varieties in the 
1960s—because of US sanctions against North Korea since 1950, North Korea was not able 
to take advantage of the Green Revolution’s gains in hybrid seeds—and succeeded in 
developing many different disease-resistant, high yielding varieties of rice and maize. North 
Korean agricultural scientists have also developed varieties suited to limiting climatic 
conditions and high altitude, along with a particular method of cold-bed seedlings.xviii The 
development of high yielding varieties for its staple food has been critical to modern food 
production in North Korea.  
 
In 1977, President Kim Il Sung delivered a major address at a party central committee 
meeting raising the issue of potential crop damage from the oncoming cold front that year, 
and measures needed to be taken to protect crops. He alerted the North Korean bureaucracy 
to what seemed to be the trend in unfavorable weather conditions for a longer term period, 
possibly a cool front that would last until the year 2000. He suggested that there needed to be 
significant measures to deal with low temperatures, droughts, and torrential rains (General 
Mobilization vol. 32:113-133). One of the longer-term measures called for by President Kim 
was the development of new strains of rice and maize which would be resistant to cold and 
lodging, short in height and growth period, and high yielding. On September 21, 1980, 
President Kim announced that the new cultivar PY 15 was expected to yield 600 kilograms 
per hectare more than existing PY 8 variety. Kim also indicated a satisfactory progress in a 
maize hybrid, Unchon 5, and that North Korean scientists were also developing a hearty 
strain of sorghum (On This Year’s Experience). Overall, North Korea has been quite 
successful in developing good rice and maize varieties over the years. 
 
A second case of scientific farming developed in North Korea pertains to 
transplanting maize. The common method of maize planting is to drop seeds directly into the 
field and cover them. In North Korea, the practice of raising maize seedlings first and 
transplanting them, as in rice transplanting, was adopted in the early 1970s. This method was 
developed to lengthen the growing time by getting the maize seed started early in the spring 
in a long stretch under plastic or straw cover in the middle of the field—a sort of greenhouse 
system—and to provide necessary nutrients in the early stage of the seedlings’ development. 
President Kim stated in December 1970 that in that year, the farmers who cultivated the 
yellow dent corn, a conventional strain, by raising the seedlings in humus cakes, produced 
4.5 to 5 tons per hectare (On Some Problems vol.25:381-395). The grown seedlings were 
transplanted as soon as the frosty season was over, lengthening the total growing period by 
15 to 20 days. President Kim emphasized the yield-boosting effects of stretching the growing 
period even by one day, especially against the effects of the cold front (Speech Delivered 
vol.30:318-339). A third case of scientific agronomics relates to the different functions of 
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different chemical fertilizers. North Korea emphasized the importance of fertilizer 
application not only as a means to provide nutrients to plants, but also as a means to 
strengthen the plants against the cold front. In the early 1970s, President Kim urged increased 
use of phosphorus and potassium along with the nitrogen North Korea was already in great 
quantities, and he reminded agricultural officials of the role of phosphorus and potassium in 
facilitating photosynthesis so that crops would be heartier in cold weather with limited 
sunlight (Speech Delivered).  
 
The last case to be described of the scientific agronomics practiced in North Korea 
pertains to the control of water temperature in the rice paddies. The technique involved was 
described by President Kim in 1982. The basic idea is to use water temperature control   to 
mitigate the damage from weather disturbances, both cold fronts and excessive heat, by 
keeping the water temperature constant (On Certain Tasks vol.37:305-335).  
 
In the four pillars of the technical revolution, irrigation was given a priority because 
of North Korea’s climatic conditions; electrification was a basis to which the other 
technological innovations could take place by providing required motive power to both 
irrigation and mechanization efforts; chemicalization was to enhance productivity through 
supplementing soil fertility and to deal with the problems stemming from disease-prone 
mono-cropping. However, these four technological interventions are also closely associated 
with the choice of agricultural development; namely North Korea has taken the similar path 
as the Green Revolution in terms of developing high yielding varieties of rice and maize – 
two staple crops – that would require irrigation and chemical fertilizer to realize its crop 
potential. 
 
Interdependency of Agriculture, Energy, and Industry 
Through agricultural intensification, North Korea made substantial progress in 
resource development in agriculture. By the late 1970s, North Korean agriculture was highly 
mechanized (4 to 5 tractors per 100 hectares), fertilizer application was one of the highest in 
the world (2 tons of chemical fertilizer per hectare), and the irrigation networks were 
extensive (more than 1,700 reservoirs throughout the country, watering 1.4 million hectares 
of fields with an irrigation network of 40,000 kilometers) with close to complete provision of 
rural electrification. After 1964, agricultural modernization accelerated in large part because 
of the development of North Korea’s industrial sector which was able to supply rural 
cooperatives and state farms with newer technology and agrochemical inputs. The state 
provided the material and technical assistance to undergird the modernization process, and 
public investment in agriculture steadily increased from an average of 9 percent of state 
expenditures during the Three-Year Plan (1954-1956) to over 12 percent during the Five-
Year Plan (1957-1960), and to nearly 20 percent during the Seven-Year Plan (1961-1967). 
Based on these resource developments in agriculture, North Korea was able to achieve major 
advances in food production, and to meet consumption needs until 1990. Figure 3 illustrates 
North Korea and its East Asian neighbors daily per caput caloric intake between the periods 
ranging from 1961 to 1990. North Korea’s ability to supply daily caloric requirement to its 
population was similar to that of South Korea, and consistently higher than that of China or 
the Philippines over the entire period. 
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Figure 3: Food Supply: Calories per caput per day, 1961-1990 
 
Source: FAO Production Yearbook, 1985 and 1991.  
 
However, this meant that North Korean agriculture became highly capital intensive 
and, consequently, energy dependent. Thus, in order to sustain the high growth in agriculture, 
industry had to supply adequate amounts of inputs such as tractors, fuels, and chemical 
fertilizers to the agricultural sector. Similarly, the growth of industry was not feasible without 
sufficient food and other agricultural production, and both industry and agriculture depended 
on an adequate and stable energy supply. Hence, given the high degree of interdependency 
between agriculture, industry, and energy, one sector’s failure to provide adequate inputs to 
the other was likely to trigger a vicious cycle of economic downturns. Given the closed 
nature of the North Korean economy (foreign trade comprised only 15 percent of the total 
GNP), once the cycle of economic downturns started, recovery would be extremely difficult, 
because the country could not take advantage of foreign trade to alleviate economic 
bottlenecks and absorb shocks (P. Park). 
 
There were unintended consequences as well. Because of North Korea’s limited 
availability of agricultural land, fields were cropped continuously without fallow.  
Furthermore, in efforts to increase the production of cereal staples, North Korea switched 
gradually to monoculture of rice and maize, using hybrid varieties without any crop rotation. 
Such industrial agriculture practices require increased inputs each time as soils continue to 
deteriorate and plant diseases tend to proliferate and wipe out the monoculture crops. At the 
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same time, North Korea’s agriculture became ever more thirsty for high energy, especially 
petroleum products, and as a result of increasing chemical inputs, its soil became acidified.  
North Korea’s Energy Crisis and its impact on agriculture 
The precipitous decline in North Korea’s industrialized economy in the 1990s—GNP 
reduced by half—and the realignment of the global politics have caused the crisis in North 
Korea’s energy sector. The impressive pace of the economic development of the 1960s and 
1970s was already slowing in the 1980s, prior to the sharp decline in the 1990s.xix Difficulties 
in the North Korean economy had been aggravated by the realignment of the international 
balance of power—in 1989, the Eastern bloc countries started to crumble and by 1991, they 
were all but gone as an alternative bloc to the capitalist bloc countries. In the past, the Soviet 
Union provided about 50% of North Korea’s foreign trade volume, China, 15%, and all 
socialist countries together, about 70%. Trade with Eastern bloc countries, especially with 
the Soviet Union and China, had been on friendly terms, often on the basis of a barter trade 
or on credit. By 1991, trade volume between Russia, Eastern Europe, and North Korea 
decreased dramatically, and by 1993, imports from Russia shrunk to about 10% of the 1987-
1990 average (Eberstadt, Rubin, and Tretyakova). China stopped providing infrastructure 
support even before the Soviets did, and by 1993, China was reluctant even to export oil to 
North Korea unless it was paid in hard currency at the time of transaction. North Korea found 
itself alone without key markets, financing, and sources of cheap energy supplies all at the 
same time. This drastic reduction of aid and of preferential terms of trade led to reduced 
industrial outputs based on energy shortages and on a corresponding shrinkage of foreign 
trade. 
 
The decline in import capacity had serious consequences for the energy sector, which 
negatively affected industry and agriculture as a whole. Total domestic production of 
fertilizer decreased from 568,000 tons in 1989 to 130,000 tons in 1996, amounting to less 
than 20% of the national requirement. The situation is similar for all categories of inputs and 
manufactured goods to agriculture. Underlying the decrease in fertilizer production was the 
collapse of crude oil imports following the decrease in all imports from the Soviet Union. It 
has been estimated that petroleum imports dropped to about half their level in the 1980s, 
imposing severe stress on transportation and distribution of agricultural products. Coal 
production dropped to a level lower than that in the early 1980s, resulting in erratic supply 
delivery to all productive sectors and low overall utilization of installed machinery capacity; 
however, it affected none more than the energy sector. 
 
In 1990, North Korea’s estimated per capita electricity generation was 2,500KWh, 
which was on a par with that of South Korea (UNDP FAO, AREP 1998 WP 1:35), and its per 
capita energy use was 71 gigajoules per person (2.4 tons coal equivalent/person), 
approximately 3.1 times that of China in the same year, and over half that of Japan (Williams, 
von Hippel, and Hayes). However, since then, the level of commercial energy supply and 
consumption in North Korea has dropped by more than one-half, and the crisis in the energy 
sector pushed the North Korean economy further into a tailspin. For instance, one of the two 
anchors in the North Korean energy sector for power generation is the coal industry. Without 
adequate supply of petroleum fuel to work the coalmines and to transport coals to factories, 
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there will be decrease in industrial production such as spare parts and/or steel, etc. This also 
meant further exacerbation of the condition of the machine and tool industry, and so forth.  
 
Oil accounts for a small portion of North Korea’s total primary energy 
consumption—only about 6%—and its use is limited to non-substitutables such as motor 
gasoline, diesel, kerosene, and jet fuel (US Department of Energy, Country Analysis Briefs: 
North Korea). Most imported oil is crude and is refined at domestic refineries.xx Nevertheless, 
North Korea must import all of the oil it consumes. Throughout the Cold War, the Soviet 
Union supplied North Korea with cheap oil at a subsidized rate. Soon after the demise of the 
Soviet Union, delivery of cheap oil discontinued, and instead North Korea had to purchase 
crude oil at a world market price. In 1990, North Korea imported a total of 2.45 million tons 
of crude oil from Russia, China, and Iran, and 0.6 million tons of refined products such as 
diesel and gasoline from China (Williams, von Hippel, and Hayes). In the same year, North 
Korea reportedly purchased 640,000 tons of oil-equivalent in refined products from the open 
market through Hong Kong (von Hippel, Savage, and Hayes 37). Although the amount of oil 
may be pale in comparison to that of other import-oil dependent countries, for a country like 
North Korea, this dependency represents a vulnerable spot in its system. For instance, even if 
North Korea wanted to expand its power generation capacity by using its coal resources, 
without adequate fuel support or electricity supply, it would be impossible to work the mines 
or transport coals to thermal stations. Table 4 shows the decline in crude oil imports from 
1989 to 1996. The data suggest a significant drop in crude oil imports between 1990 and 
1991 alone, and by 1996, China was the sole supplier. North Korea also imports coking coal, 
another strategic raw material for energy generation.xxi Coking coal is also required in North 
Korea’s strategic metallurgic industry, which makes up a large portion of its export sector. 
The annual demand for coking coal was estimated to be at a level of 3 million tons, and 
North Korea imported coke from the Soviet Union until 1990; from 1992 to the present, 
China has been the main supplier.  
 
Table 4: Crude oil imports to North Korea (Unit: thousand metric tons) 
Exporter 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996(A) 
China 1,140 1,160 1,100 1,100 830 1,050 1,020 1,000 
Russia 500 410 -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Libya -- -- 200 200 80 100 80 -- 
Iran 920 980 220 220 -- 210 -- -- 
Total 2,650 2,450 1,890 1,520 910 1,360 1,100 1,000 
Note:  (A) Extrapolation of statistics for the first two quarters of 1996. More recent statistics suggest that the total 
was probably considerably lower.  
Source:  von Hippel, Savage and Hayes, p.38. This source is based on reports from a South Korean source, Korea 
Energy Economic Institute. 
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According to the U.S. Department of Energy, North Korea’s total electricity 
consumption in 2001 was still 58% of what it was in 1991, no increase occurred in the year-
to-year increase in electricity consumption during the entire period from 1992 to 2001, 
except in 1992, when there was a 1% increase. As discussed in the rural electrification 
section of this paper, although North Korea has an impressive national electricity 
transmission and distribution grid, extended to practically every corner of even the remotest 
villages, and a record of high per capita energy consumption in the past, the events of the 
past decade render North Korea’s energy system useless.  
 
In the mid-1990s, the vulnerabilities of the North Korean energy system took another 
decisive blow, this time from nature. A series of natural disasters—hails in 1994, floods in 
1995 and 1996, followed by a drought, then tidal waves in 1997—severely damaged 
coalmines and hydropower plants. In addition to destructions to crops and agricultural land, 
the energy infrastructure was irrevocably damaged. Williams, von Hippel, and Hayes 
describe the impact of these disasters, stating: 
 
Coalmines were flooded (some mines producing the best quality coal, near 
Anju, were on the coast below sea level to begin with). Hydroelectric production 
was affected by floodwaters that damaged turbines and silted up reservoirs, then by 
drought that reduced water supplies below the levels needed to generate power. 
Electric transmission and distribution lines were damaged, as were roads and 
transportation equipment. Heavy erosion and scavenging for food denuded 
landscapes, reducing the availability of biomass for energy use. (5) 
 
It is also likely that the majority of the damage done by the flooding was to fill 
impoundments with silt, reducing the capacity of dams and clogging spillways and channels. 
The floods undoubtedly not only damaged turbines, as Williams, von Hippel and Hayes 
indicate, but also gates and other mechanical equipment. These damages have been difficult 
for North Korea to reverse, as rebuilding required heavy equipment and fuel. In 1990, 
thermal (coal- and oil-fired) and hydroelectric power plants produced approximately equal 
amounts of electricity, but after flood damages to large hydroelectric plants, thermal plants 
became the primary source of power generation.  
 
These converging factors resulted in a rapid contraction of the energy sector in the 
first half of the 1990s, and an incremental decline in the latter half of the 1990s along a 
similar line: a continuing decline in the supply of crude oil; continuing degradation of 
electricity infrastructures—power generation, electricity transmission and distribution—and 
of industrial facilities; damage to industrial electric motors from poor quality electricity 
(unstable voltage and frequency); continuing difficulties with the transport of all goods, 
especially coal; and difficulties in coal production related to lack of electricity. Consequently, 
shortages of fuel and electric supply were felt throughout the North Korean economy, and by 
1996, energy consumption dropped by 51%, affecting all sectors, but by very different rates, 
during this period. By 1996, road and rail freight transport were reduced to 40% of their 1990 
levels. Iron and steel production were reduced to 36% of 1990 levels, and cement production 
to 32%. Also affected were residential and commercial heating and lighting, as well as public 
health facilities (Williams, von Hippel, and Hayes 5–6).  
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Most of all, this crisis in the energy sector had a detrimental impact on North Korea’s 
highly industrialized agriculture, which was/is based on its energy supply and fossil-fuel 
products. Since North Korea’s agriculture is closely linked to industry and the energy regime, 
the collapse of the energy regime created a domino effect such that both manufacturing and 
agriculture that depended heavily on industrial inputs also collapsed, ultimately resulting in a 
human tragedy of truly biblical proportions in the mid-1990s.  
 
The Collapse of Industrial Agriculture 
 
The Collapse of Motive Power (Irrigation, Mechanization) 
 
Irrigation Failure 
 The 1995 and 1996 floods severely damaged North Korea’s agricultural sector, 
especially highly electrified irrigation networks and agricultural infrastructure. Although 
water is sourced from both surface supplies and ground aquifers, irrigation is mainly from 
surface water, and water for all but 300,000 hectares of 1 to 1.5 million hectares of irrigated 
areaxxii must be pumped from rivers with considerable lifts using electricity and diesel fuel, 
after which it is distributed to crops by canals, often with further pumping, particularly for 
upland crops.  
 
The bulk of the infrastructure—reservoirs, pump stations and ancillary equipment, 
weirs, water distribution and drainage systems—was constructed during the 1960s and 1970s. 
A large proportion of the 32,000 pumps for irrigation were installed more than 30 years ago 
(UNDP FAO, AREP 1998 WP 1:14); consequently, most installations have reached the end 
of their economic life and are due for replacement. A significant portion of the irrigation 
system has deteriorated to the point of unreliability because of broken-down pump-sets, worn 
foot-valves, leaking distribution and steel delivery pipes, silted distribution systems, 
dysfunctional drainage systems, etc.; consequently, system losses have reached a critical 
level and have impacted significantly on yield. For instance, 102 reservoirs have “blown out” 
due to flood damage, and only 2,800 pump stations (or 10%) are operational; of the 2,000 km 
of distribution and delivery steel pipe, 180 km is over 30 years old and is severely corroded 
and unserviceable; an additional 830 km leaks badly and is in need of replacement. Some 
2,088 km (or 40%) of the weirs is in need of urgent repairs or rehabilitation. North Korea 
states that 6,000 pump-sets should be replaced each year to bring the sector back to full 
operational efficiency.  
 
North Korea’s irrigation system is energy intensive: there are large complex irrigation 
networks, each composed of several sources, pumping stations, and reservoirs linked by 
canals, pipelines, and tunnels. Water pumping is required at various points in the system, and 
in order to pump water, the system requires electricity and/or diesel fuel. Rice requires an 
average of slightly less than 10,000 cubic meters of irrigation water per hectare per year, and 
wheat and maize require 3,060 and 1,265 cubic meters per hectare per year, respectively 
(UNDP FAO, AREP 1998 WP 1:9). The UNDP states that satisfactorily pumping this 
amount of water requires an average of 1,200 kWh per hectare per year, corresponding to an 
annual national requirement of 1.2 billion kWh (9). Because electricity is also needed to 
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operate other stationary equipment on farms and machine tools, an additional 460 million 
kWh per year is needed, bringing the total agricultural electricity requirement to an estimated 
1.7 billion kWh per year (Williams, von Hippel, and Hayes 10). According to Williams, von 
Hippel, and Hayes, the total current rural electricity consumption level is approximately 1.9 
billion kWh per year, out of a total rural electricity requirement of 2.9 billion kWh per year, 
including residential, public, and commercial uses; this leaves a shortfall of 1 billion kWh 
(10).xxiii Of this, the most critical shortfall for agriculture has been a decrease of 300 million 
kWh in electricity for irrigation pumping, and a decrease of 350 million kWh decline for 
other agricultural uses.  
 
Furthermore, other problems beyond the availability of electricity exist in meeting 
rural energy requirements. One such problem is the timing of the electricity supply: the 
nature of agriculture requires that water be delivered at the right times during the growing 
season; hence reliability is very important. With the energy sector in disarray, even if the 
agricultural sector is given priority in electricity distribution, a problem remains with 
receiving power at the time when agricultural production demands it. To illustrate this point, 
Williams, von Hippel, and Hayes posit that, given a national generating capacity of 4.7 GW, 
with an actual online capacity of 3.1 GW in 1996, after accounting for system losses in 
transmission and distribution, irrigation pumping demand represents “over one-third of all” 
of North Korea’s generating capacity (10). Considering the deterioration of its energy 
infrastructure, it would be unrealistic to expect North Korea’s energy sector to be able to 
increase its power generation on demand and redirect generated electricity supply to its 
agricultural sector at the peak time.  
 
In sum, energy has been critical to the operation of North Korea’s irrigation system, 
but scarcity of electricity and fuel has made it impossible to guarantee timely supplies of 
water to the field. The already precarious condition of canals and pumping stations has been 
severely damaged by the natural disasters of 1995 and 1996, while pumping stations and 
steel pipes used in the system have suffered from a lack of spare parts and from poor 
maintenance. The breakdown of the irrigation system due to the lack of spare parts and 
electricity has caused the severe drop in North Korea’s grain production. 
 
Shortage of Farm Power 
The industrial base of North Korea enabled the country to motorize the agricultural 
sector in a major way, potentially providing 77% of all the farm power used in field level 
production and on-farm primary processing for its two major crops, rice and maize (UNDP 
FAO, AREP 1998 WP 2:1).xxiv In contrast, under normal circumstances the agricultural 
population, through its labor force of 3.4 million, contributes only 9% of farm power, while 
draft animals contribute 14% to the total agricultural production power availability. To 
achieve this level of mechanization, a range of agricultural machinery and equipment had 
been developed and manufactured in country, and relatively large numbers of tractors, 
agricultural implements, and small engines and machinery were distributed to cooperatives.  
 
On the other hand, the high level of mechanization in agriculture meant that when 
North Korea could no longer support its industrial and agricultural mechanization base, 
agriculture faced serious constraints in production. Two constraints stood out in particular: a 
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lack of fuel and electricity necessary to keep machinery and equipment running during the 
agricultural production process; and a lack of spare parts vital to keeping agricultural 
machinery operating. An acute shortage of fuel, electricity, raw materials, consumable 
machine tool parts (e.g., cutting steel) and other inputs depressed the manufacturing volume 
and distribution of new replacement machinery and equipment to the farms. There was no 
need to manufacture new tractors and machinery, even if it were possible, because the farms 
could not supply enough fuel to the existing fleet of equipment. Worn-out tires were kept in 
continuous use with metal plates bolted into the sidewalls, tractors still operated when the 
steering linkages were worn to unsafe limits, and tillage implements remained in use even 
after shares and tips had already worn out. Some 20,000 tractors were immobilized due to a 
lack of tires, as well as spare parts such as piston rings, cylinder liners, replacement gears, 
and so forth (UN FAO, AREP 1998 WP 2:6). By the end of 1998, much of the agricultural 
machinery and equipment had become inoperable, either because it reached the end of its 
service life or because of the lack of spare parts; fuel to operate the machinery for critical 
mechanized operations had become exceedingly scarce as fuel allocations were reduced to 
perhaps only 20% of pre-crisis levels (2).  
 
The combined effect of acute shortages of fuel and vital spare parts significantly 
altered the balance of farm power availability. At this time, North Korea had only 20% of the 
motorized capacity of farm machinery and equipment, deeply compromising the timely 
completion of field operations, and leading to reduced yields and increased harvesting and 
post-harvest losses.  
 
The net result of this shift in the balance of farm power is steep reduction of motive 
power, and by 1998, total farm power was composed of approximately one-third each of 
manual labor, draft animals, and mechanization. Even with North Korea’s practice of one 
million plus labor mobilization during critical times during agricultural season,xxv the 
availability of farm power was still reduced dramatically. If quantified in terms of 
horsepower (hp), in 1998, the total potential power that could be used for agricultural 
production of rice and maize was 2,903 MW (3.89 million hp). This represented a potential 
power availability of approximately 1.4 kW per hectare (1.9 hp per hectare), of which 1.1 
kW per hectare (1.5 hp per hectare) was mechanized. In other words, the total motorized 
farm power availability had been reduced from approximately 2,231 MW (3 million 
horsepower) to 20% of this figure (463 MW or 0.6 million horsepower).xxvi This signified an 
overall reduction in motorized mechanization levels of approximately 80% and an overall 
reduction of 60% of total farm power availability.  
 
Shortages of fuel, functioning machinery, and equipment have necessitated the re-
emergence of draft animal use and the additional requirement of manual labor. Land 
preparation, transplanting, and harvesting operations were done by machines in the past; now 
much of it is done manually or by draft animal. It has proved impossible to perform all 
operations previously carried out by machinery simply by use of manual labor or work 
animals (e.g., plowing, pumping of water for irrigation, harvesting, threshing, etc.) in a 
timely manner, in particular the peak times around harvesting and planting of double crops 
have been severely affected, reducing productivity and increasing post-harvest losses. 
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Consequently, it is not difficult to conclude the negative impact on crop yields and on overall 
agricultural production.  
 
The Collapse of Soil Fertility (Fertilizer) 
Industrial agriculture requires a steady flow of inorganic chemical fertilizers to 
guarantee a high yield. Under North Korean soil and growing conditions, the recommended 
rate of the plant nutrients nitrogen (N), phosphate (P), and potassium (K) is said to be 
approximately 694kg per hectare per year. This translates into an annual fertilizer 
requirement of around 800,000 tons of NPK per year for rice and maize production of 
1,170,000 hectares.xxvii  
 
Prior to 1990, North Korea’s fertilizer industry was vibrant, meeting most of its 
agricultural needs for macronutrients N and P, but K was imported entirely due to a lack of 
usable potash reserve in the country. Fertilizer production requirements of feedstock, 
equipment and spares were also imported from the Soviet Union and China prior to 1990; 
however, since then, there had been marked decline in the capacity to import needed inputs 
for fertilizer production. Some of the production units and plants were running at nominal 
capacity, plagued by numerous problems relating to age of plants, lack of resources for 
replacement of equipment and procurement of spares, non-availability of petroleum-based 
feedstock and raw materials coupled with inefficient production technology and the shortage 
of electricity inevitably limited productivity of fertilizer plants.  
 
By 1996, North Korean fertilizer production fell to 130,000 tons, less than 17% of the 
national requirement, with essentially no imports to supplement the consumption need of its 
agricultural sector. Figure 4 illustrates the relative decline in NPK consumption in North 
Korea from 1989 to 1999.  
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Figure 4: NPK Consumption in North Korea from 1989-1999 
            
Year 
Source: United Nations FAO. Special Report FAO/WFP Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission to the DPRK (June 29, 
1999). 
 
The Environmental Factors 
As noted earlier in the paper, in 1995 and 1996, North Korea was struck by torrential 
rains, with high tidal waves and floods that engulfed a large part of its agricultural area, 
severely affecting not only the year’s agricultural production, but more important, damaging 
agricultural infrastructures, such as the irrigation network, transport, and property (UN FAO, 
Crop and Food Supply Assessment, 22 December 1995), pushing the country’s capacity to 
produce food further into the margins. In 1995, North Korea recorded 23 inches of rain in ten 
days, and in some areas as much as 18 inches of rain fell in a single day, bringing floods that 
were considered the worst in a century (Woo-Cumings). Sixty to seventy people were 
reported dead, and the North Korean Government estimated that the floods affected 75 
percent of the country, displacing 5.2 million people. Damages were extensive: 1.2 million 
hectares of agricultural land affected, 1.9 million tons of grains lost, and the total cost of the 
flood damages at 15 billion dollars (UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs, Assessment of 
Damage).xxviii 1996 was no less severe; what is more, floods hit areas that were already 
struck by the previous year’s floods. When the rain stopped in late July, 116 people were 
dead, 3 million people were displaced in 117 towns and counties, and 20% of the harvest was 
destroyed, with total damage estimated at 1.7 billion dollars (Actions by Churches Together 
International). The agricultural land was hit especially hard since the bulk of the rain fell on 
the western plains, where the country’s most fertile land is found. Table 5 indicates the 
damages sustained in agricultural land in 1995 and 1996. 
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Table 5: Agricultural land damaged by floods in 1995 and 1996 in North Korea  
(Unit: ‘000 ha) 
Year Land sub-
merged 
Land 
washed 
away 
Land 
buried 
Total 
damaged 
Total 
arable land 
Damaged in 
% of arable 
land 
1995 331.0 10.7 18.2 359.9 1,853.0 19% 
1996 273.1 9.7 15.0 297.7 1,853.0 16% 
Source:  Information is extracted from Draft report presented to the participants of Thematic Roundtable on AREP 
in DPR Korea in Geneva, Switzerland, hosted by UNDP, May 28-29, 1998. Information originates from North 
Korea’s Flood Damage Rehabilitation Committee. 
 
Although the exact toll the 1995 and 1996 floods had on North Korea may differ from 
the official governmental announcements, foreign observers agreed that the disasters 
devastated North Korea’s industrial and agricultural infrastructures. Epic floods were 
followed by severe droughts in 1997, 2000, 2001, and complemented by cold winters (Woo-
Cumings 28), further exacerbating North Korea’s ability to produce food.  
 
However, these natural disasters contributed to and hastened the collapse of 
agriculture in North Korea rather than created it. These natural calamities took such a 
devastating toll on North Korean agriculture because of the human-made ecological disaster 
that has been progressing ever since the modernization project accelerated in the 1960s. 
Preceding the natural disasters in the mid-1990s, in 1991, UNDP issued a concern regarding 
North Korea’s intensive use of chemicals, stating that such practices had led to land 
degradation vis-à-vis declining soil fertility, erosion and acidification, and water pollution 
(US Library of Congress, North Korea Country Studies).  
 
The Collapse of Seed Production 
Along with the overall decline in other parts of the agricultural sector, the production 
of seed also collapsed in the mid-1990s. There are both quantity and quality problems 
associated with seed production. Quantitatively, seed production levels have been inadequate 
since the crisis began. Seed production in North Korea takes place at the county level, 
undertaken by 240 state seed farms. In the pre-crisis period these farms produced 250,000 
tons of seed: 101,000 tons of rice, 37,000 tons of maize, 23,000 tons of other cereals, 83,000 
tons of potatoes, 400 tons of vegetables, and 50 tons of industrial crops, with other crops the 
remainder (UNDP FAO, AREP 1998 vol 1:35). Similar to that of other units in the 
agricultural sector, seed farms are also affected by the shortage of agro-inputs and the lack of 
an adequate energy supply to irrigate or to mobilize machines and equipment. Consequently, 
seed threshing, cleaning, treatment, processing, storage, packaging, and distribution have 
been adversely affected, leading to high post-production losses. Inadequate irrigation means 
lower crop yields (35). The lack of inputs and equipment has substantially decreased 
available seed quantity, and this means that farmers have to postpone seed renewal of non-
hybrids for extended numbers of seasons and use lower-yielding retained seeds. 
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The quality of available seeds has been problematic for both hybrid seed production 
and traditional renewal varieties. Hybridization of seeds is based on plant germplasm; 
however, the local germplasm suffers from a narrow genetic base, and traditional major 
varieties are in need of renewal after 10–15 years of use. North Korea’s seed multiplication 
system is relatively less developed compared to international standards, and the quality 
control system is also considered in need of improvement. One of the issues affecting North 
Korea’s ability to access international germplasm and/or technologies is US economic 
sanctions against North Korea. As noted earlier US economic sanctions constrain North 
Korea from accessing many of the international agricultural research centers that receive US 
funds.  
 
In addition, cooperatives are using higher rates of seeding to mitigate seed quality 
problems and the effects of cold weather. In North Korea, plant densities are high, and the 
seed application rate is 125 kg per hectare, in the case of paddy, and 45 kg per hectare, in the 
case of maize. However, the FAO reports that seed rates were increased to 150 kg per hectare 
for paddy and 60 kg per hectare for maize in 1998 because the supply of plastic sheets 
needed for covering seed beds during cold weather has been limited (UN FAO, Crop and 
Food Supply Assessment, November 1998). It has been noted that no more than 60 percent of 
the seed quantity actually used by cooperatives would be needed if it were of high quality 
(UNDP FAO, AREP 1998 vol 1:35). 
 
In sum, seed production decreased because of the lack of agro-inputs; the hybrid and 
traditional seeds being produced are suffering from low quality due to a narrow genetic base 
and non-renewal. In turn, the lack of agro-inputs, such as plastic sheets, and poor quality 
seeds force cooperatives to use higher rates of the shrinking supply of seeds.  
 
Conclusion 
For almost half a century, North Korea’s agricultural sector was able to meet national 
needs for food grain, despite the topographical disadvantages, a harsh climate, and a growing 
population that doubled in size from 10 million to 22 million. This seeming success, however, 
was based on the fragile balance of a complex set of social, ecological, political, and 
economic forces; if any one of these factors became unstable, the entire system would shatter. 
In the mid-1990s, North Korea’s agriculture collapsed, and the ensuing food crisis became a 
large-scale famine. Many explanations were offered by a series of studies and observations as 
to why the agricultural decline had taken place, and most of these explanations fall into three 
categories of arguments: economic, organizational, and environmental.  
 
The economic arguments attribute North Korea’s inability to provide needed inputs to 
either shrinkage in macroeconomic conditions, i.e., dissolution of the socialist system or the 
deterioration of North Korea’s industries. The argument assumes that if needed inputs were 
provided, agricultural production would recover to its previous levels. However, such a 
recovery is unlikely given the state of environmental degradation in North Korea, the 
unpredictable global ecological impact yet to come, and the social changes that have 
occurred in North Korea as a result of the agricultural crisis during the last decade. The 
organizational argument provides insights into the shortcomings of the collective structure 
and planned economy, but as indicated earlier, it does not explain the fact that the system 
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functioned reasonably well for a half century without very much change. This line of 
argument frequently offers family farming and the market solution as a silver bullet; however, 
experiences in transition economies tell a different story. Would the market bring back 
traditional organic farming, and do away with industrial agriculture? Last, the environmental 
argument provides an explanation for the physical degradation of North Korea’s agricultural 
land and the impact of the global ecological pattern, together with what may have tipped the 
balance of the nation’s agricultural condition in the latter half of the 1990s. But this argument 
does not adequately explain the decline since the late 1980s, before the natural disasters 
occurred, or in the absence of the calamities in the years since.  
 
All three arguments provide partial explanations for—but not a comprehensive 
picture of—the actual collapse of agriculture in North Korea. North Korea was a diligent 
student of modernization; modernization’s notion of societal progress was synonymous with 
nation-building and liberation in North Korea. From the 1950s to the late 1980s, agriculture 
in North Korea underwent a drastic transformation as an important part of the country’s 
modernization project. In striving for industrial agriculture, North Korea abandoned 
traditional rotational systems, including fallowing or planting with leguminous crops, and 
largely ended the practice of using organic fertilizers.  From the outset, food grain production 
was an energy-intensive undertaking, designed to succeed only when energy was readily 
available. Modern farming practices emphasized chemicalization, with the intensive use of 
inorganic fertilizer and other, usually petroleum-based, agro-chemicals, without due 
consideration for the devastating impact such technical interventions would have on 
ecological relations. Paddy and maize fields were designed to take full advantage of the 
potential for mechanization, and irrigation systems were heavily dependent upon electrically-
powered surface water pumping. All land with any potential for paddy and maize production 
was brought into cultivation without alternating crops or fallowing. Increasingly expensive 
and environmentally problematic tidelands reclamation and drainage projects were 
undertaken to increase arable land. The use of chemical fertilizer, insecticide, and herbicide 
was intense. The modern system of intensive agriculture introduced in North Korea enabled 
continuous production, including double-cropping of cereals, but has resulted in soils highly 
depleted of naturally-occurring nutrients. 
 
There were other unintended consequences of the adoption of industrial farm 
techniques. Even before natural disasters brought devastation to North Korea, the country 
was already experiencing a decline in production due to both internal and external resource 
depletion. In an attempt to produce adequate cereal staples for the population, North Korea 
switched gradually to monoculture maize production, using hybrid varieties without any crop 
rotation. These industrial agriculture practices required increased inputs each time as soils 
continued to deteriorate and plant diseases tended to proliferate and wipe out the 
monoculture crops. At the same time, North Korea’s agriculture industry required ever-
increasing amounts of high energy, especially petroleum products, and as a result of 
increasing chemical inputs, the soil became acidified. In an effort to expand arable area, 
North Korea initiated reclamation projects and the terracing of hills. These projects, in turn, 
contributed to further environmental degradation.  
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On the other hand, in order to sustain the high growth in agriculture, North Korean 
industry had to supply adequate amounts of inputs such as tractors, fuels, and chemical 
fertilizers to the agricultural sector. This system was supported in part by the availability of 
energy. Most of the energy needed in the agricultural sector came from oil and natural gas, of 
which North Korea had neither. Similarly, the growth of industry was not feasible without 
sufficient food and other wage goods from the agricultural sector, as the growth of industry 
depended on the quality of its labor, requiring a significant increase in the supply of food and 
consumer goods. Given the highly interdependent relationship between agriculture and 
industry, one sector’s failure to provide adequate inputs to the other was likely to trigger a 
vicious cycle of economic downturns.  
 
Although North Korea strived for a self-reliant economy, in reality, its industrial 
agriculture was critically dependent on imports. Direct imports helped meet fertilizer needs 
and provided most other agro-chemicals as well as petroleum and fuel for farm machinery. 
Domestic industrial sector production in support of agriculture also depended heavily on 
imports of raw materials, ranging from petroleum feedstock for the fertilizer industry to coke 
for the steel needed for machinery manufacturing. The demise of the socialist bloc and the 
Soviet Union left North Korea bereft of political allies, trading partners, and led to the 
resultant agrarian crisis. Even though foreign trade occupies a small portion of the North 
Korean economy, that portion was critical to the entire system of the economy because it is 
composed of irreplaceable inputs such as crude oil, petroleum products, coking coal, and 
parts for machinery and equipment. Drastic declines in these critical inputs, which resulted 
from the breakdown of trade with the Soviet Union in 1991, had a detrimental impact on the 
North Korean economy.  
 
At the same time, after several decades of extensive and intensive agricultural 
modernization, environmental degradation of production sites became visibly apparent, 
requiring more and more inputs just to maintain previous level of productivity. This fragile 
production system could not withstand the destruction impact of the natural calamities of 
1995 and 1996, nor was it able to weather the precipitous decline in agro-chemical inputs; 
consequently, the agricultural system collapsed. North Korea’s Green Revolution brought 
“ghost acres”xxixon which a glass house of greater food self-sufficiency was built. To bring 
ghost acres into production, fossil fuel had become as vital a resource for its agriculture as 
land and water resources, and this change in the production regime was made possible by the 
availability of internal and external fossil fuel resources to support the industrialization of 
agriculture.  
 
Understanding the cause of the agricultural collapse is important, not only because 
North Korea is one of the least understood countries in the world, but also because its 
industrialized agriculture is an example of what can happen to highly energy-dependent, 
modern agriculture. To begin with, North Korea has shown the world that modern agriculture 
is unsustainable—economically, politically, socially, and environmentally. It damages land, 
draining water supplies and polluting the environment. And all of this requires greater and 
greater fossil fuel inputs to pump irrigation water, to replace nutrients, to provide pest 
protection, to remediate the environment, and to simply maintain crop production levels. Yet 
this necessary fossil fuel input will crash headlong into declining fossil fuel production. Oil 
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has dominated much of modern agriculture—as it has other sectors—in the last century, and 
an eventual contraction of petroleum supplies will likely result in reduced food production, as 
we have seen in North Korea during the last 15 years.  
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NOTES 
 
iThe North Korean Government has not released an official figure on the total number of famine-
related deaths. There are, however, widely varied claims by foreign observers, especially in the U.S. 
regarding the number of famine-related deaths that ranges from 200,000 to 3.5 million. U.S. 
Congressional staffers, Mark Kirk, Peter Brooks and Maria Pica put the figure between 900,000 to 2.4 
million from 1995-1998 (Final Report of the Visit to North Korea and China to the International 
Relations Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives, August 31, 1998);Peter Hayes of the 
Nautilus Institute put a figure between 200,000-300,000 as the lower range and 2 million as the upper 
range (PBS interview, A News Hour with Jim Lehrer on February 11, 1999); Marcus Noland and his 
colleagues estimate at 2.8 million to 3.5 million (Noland, Robinson, and Wang in Famine in North 
Korea: Causes and Cures, 1999); Nicholas Eberstadt estimates at “more than three million,” (quoted in 
Noland et al.:1999); Andrew Natsios, current administrator of USAID put the figure between 2 million 
to 3 million (The Great North Korean Famine: Famine, Politics, and Foreign Policy, 2001:201); Two 
American demographers, Daniel Goodkind and Lorraine West estimates the numbers between 600,000 
and one million (The North Korean Famine and Its Demographic Impact, 2001). Debates on the same 
subject within the South Korean scholarships resemble a similar number range to the U.S. After 
reviewing the method and ‘empirical’ evidence presented in each of the arguments in the number 
debate in the U.S. and South Korea, the numbers forwarded by authors Goodkind and West in the U.S., 
and Lee Suk (Lee estimates the famine-related deaths at 25,000 to 1.17 million between 1994 to 2000, 
with per annum rate of 36,000 to 167,000. 2004) in South Korea appear to be the most credible in the 
current context of research on North Korea (1994-2000 nyon Bukhan Kikun 2004). That is, all figures 
presented as ‘facts’ in the debates regarding the famine-related deaths in North Korea are estimates 
based on information that is largely founded on inferences from fragmented data, speculation, and 
political disposition. 
ii South Korea is often referred to as the “Korean miracle” by many as a model of successful 
development. However, before South Korea earned its reputation as one of the four East Asia 
miracles—the others are Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore—North Korea exceeded South Korea in 
economic and social development. 
iii To name a few, economists Gordon White, Jon Halliday, Joan Robinson; a well known historian, 
Bruce Cumings among others. 
iv Metric ton is used in this paper. 
v Quinones estimates at 7.4 million MT in 1984. 
vi Figure 1 is a composite of three data sources: North Korean official report from 1960 to 1984, Ken 
Quinones’s estimate from 1960 to 1995, and UN agencies estimate from 1989 to 2004.  
vii FAO uses 1993 as the base year—there was a hailstorm in 1994—and calculated a rate of structural 
decline in agriculture, in the two year period between 1993 and 1995, the production of paddy is 
assumed to have decreased by 10% and maize 15%, i.e., the annual rate plus a factor for an increasing 
rate of decline. (UN FAO, Special Report 1995.) 
viiiOther organizational arrangements mean the organizational structure of the North Korean collective 
farms such as the sub-work teams, incentive structure, management arrangement and 
technical/extension services, etc. 
ix Woo-Cumings argues that North Korea was profoundly affected by the ENSO (El Nino Southern 
Oscillation) of 1997-1998, said to be “one of the worst in recorded history going back some three 
hundred years.” For more ENSO details refer to Mike Davis’s (2001) Late Victorian Holocausts: El 
Nino Famines and the Making of the Third World (London: Verso). 
xUntil the mid-1980s, a sub-work team consisted of twenty to twenty-five people. 
xi North Korea was formally established as the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in September 
1948. 
xii Size of a kitchen-garden is around 30 pyong (100 square meters). 
xiii Ri is the smallest administrative unit in the rural area in North Korea, and it is comparable to a 
township in the U.S. 
xiv 1 chongbo equals approximately 1 hectare (0.992). 
xv North Korea’s total arable land area of 1.99 million hectares, about 980,000 hectares have irrigation 
as of 1998 (UNDP FAO, AREP 1998). 
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xvi Rural households include both agricultural and non-agricultural users. This is due to the 
decentralized pattern of development, where each community is self-containing unit. 
xvii The FAO figures used here are from Smith and Huang. Smith and Huang have indicated in their 
paper that these were from annual FAO Yearbook, and their data include more years than I have 
extrapolated here.  
xviii Farmers plant rice seedlings in protected dry beds, enabling them to begin growing their rice crop 
before the normal cropping season. 
xix Reasons for the slowdown included large increases in military spending due to the heightened 
political atmosphere in the Korean peninsula in the late 1960s (escalated military tension with South 
Korea and the US in the Cold War), the global oil crises of the 1970s and the slowdown of the world 
economy, and the foreign debt North Korea incurred to OECD countries in the early 1970s. North 
Korea struggled to repay the debt initially in the late 1970s, then continued with renegotiating the 
terms, but the debt crisis ultimately came to head. North Korea was declared by the Western banks to 
be a debt-defaulted nation in the mid-1980s. 
xx In describing North Korea’s refineries, David von Hippel and his colleagues state the following: 
“Two operating oil refineries produced as of 1990 the bulk of refined products used in the country. As 
of 1995 and 1996 (and 2000), only one of the two refineries was apparently operating, and imports of 
refined products had not expanded sufficiently to replace the lost production. A third, smaller refinery 
on the West Coast of the DPRK reportedly operates sporadically when crude oil shipments are 
available” (von Hippel, Savage, and Hayes 9)  
xxi Coking coal is a type of bituminous coal from which coke is derived. Coke is used as a fuel and as a 
reducing agent in smelting iron ore in a blast furnace to make steel. 
xxii Like many other facts about North Korea, there are conflicting reports and estimates on irrigated 
land area in North Korea. Most recent estimates by the US Library of Congress North Korea Country 
Studies (2004) put irrigated land at 1.4 million; P. Döll and S. Siebert estimate 1.46 million hectares by 
using FAOSTAT information in 1999; and the UNDP estimates it at about 1 million hectares (UNDP 
FAO, AREP 1998 WP 1:6) in 1998. 
xxiii According to the authors, in North Korea there are 1.5 million rural households that require over 
900 million kWh per year for electrical loads such as lights, refrigerators, irons, and televisions. The 
public and commercial users require additional 300 million kWh per year, and all these combined 
bring the total rural electricity requirement to 2.9 billion kWh per year. 
xxivThis does not include power needs for irrigation and domestic electricity supplies. 
xxv Additional labor for the transplanting and harvest seasons is supplemented by urbanites. North 
Korea regularly uses labor mobilization campaigns during peak agricultural season to shift labor from 
urban areas to rural areas to assist in planting and harvesting, and participation of this type of voluntary 
labor force has increased substantially since the agricultural crisis. This “voluntary” labor has been a 
part of regular mass mobilization for decades, throughout the social hierarchy. Such mobilizations are 
frequent in North Korea, serving as important social gatherings, and as the volunteers join the regular 
agricultural work force, festivals and gatherings are organized. 
xxvi 1 horsepower equals 746 watts, and 1 mega watt (MW) equals 1 million watts. Hence 2,231 MW 
equals 2,990,617 hp, and 463 MW equals 620,643 hp. 
xxvii (UNDP FAO, AREP 1998 WP 3:23); FAO/WFP puts the annual requirement of plant nutrient NPK 
at 700,000 tons in its June 1999 special report, but the report does not specify the amount of acreage 
associated with such requirement, hence I have decided to use the AREP assessment in this paper.  
xxviiiIt is quite remarkable considering the scale of floods, and as the author recalls that the North 
Korean government sent military helicopters to rescue people in remote areas of the country. 
xxix The concept of “Ghost Acres” is attributed to William R. Catton in his book Overshoot: The 
Ecological Basis of Revolutionary Change It refers to the fact that the stocks of fossil fuels being 
consumed today are the products of ancient photosynthesis (“congealed solar energy”) that took place 
in long-gone forests and swamps hundreds of millions of years ago. 
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